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Abstract—Adversarial examples are delicately perturbed in-
puts, which aim to mislead machine learning models towards
incorrect outputs. While most of the existing work focuses on
generating adversarial perturbations in multi-class classification
problems, many real-world applications fall into the multi-label
setting in which one instance could be associated with more than
one label. For example, a spammer may generate adversarial
spams with malicious advertising while maintaining the other
labels such as topic labels unchanged. To analyze the vulnerability
and robustness of multi-label learning models, we investigate
the generation of multi-label adversarial perturbations. This is a
challenging task due to the uncertain number of positive labels
associated with one instance, as well as the fact that multiple
labels are usually not mutually exclusive with each other. To
bridge this gap, in this paper, we propose a general attacking
framework targeting on multi-label classification problem and
conduct a premier analysis on the perturbations for deep neural
networks. Leveraging the ranking relationships among labels,
we further design a ranking-based framework to attack multi-
label ranking algorithms. We specify the connection between
the two proposed frameworks and separately design two specific
methods grounded on each of them to generate targeted multi-
label perturbations. Experiments on real-world multi-label image
classification and ranking problems demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed frameworks and provide insights of the vulnera-
bility of multi-label deep learning models under diverse targeted
attacking strategies. Several interesting findings including an
unpolished defensive strategy, which could potentially enhance
the interpretability and robustness of multi-label deep learning
models, are further presented and discussed at the end.
Index Terms—deep learning, multi-label learning, security,
deep neural network, adversarial examples
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial machine learning, which aims to enhance the
security of machine learning models in adversarial settings,
has attracted a lot of attentions in recent years. An intriguing
property shared among vast models, especially for deep neural
networks, is their vulnerabilities to adversarial examples, i.e.,
given malicious inputs with delicate perturbations, a model
could be easily misled to generate erroneous decisions [1]–
[3]. The existence of adversarial examples could lead to severe
impacts on the safe adoption of machine learning models
in various applications, such as spammer filtering [4], [5],
malware detection [6], and autonomous driving [7]. It also
motivates the explorations of generating powerful perturba-
tions to analyze the vulnerability of machine learning models,
detect their blind spots, and improve their robustness [8]–[10].
Existing work has been widely conducted in generating ad-
versarial examples for multi-class classification algorithms [1],
[2], [11]–[13]. Most of them are gradient-based approaches
and have been proved to be effective on both targeted or non-
targeted attacks. However, in many real-world applications, an
instance may be associated with multiple labels. For example,
in text categorization, a document may cover a range of topics,
such as politics, economics, and diplomacy [14]; in image
classification, a neural scene image can contain both fields
and mountains [15]. Different from the multi-class setting in
which classes are mutually exclusive and one instance can
only be assigned to one class (label), in multi-label learning,
each instance can be associated with multiple labels, thus
opening more opportunities for attackers and leading to larger
uncertainties for defenders.
Multi-label adversarial examples widely exist in both mali-
cious and benign activities. From an attacker’s perspective, he
or she would like to alter certain labels while keeping some
others unchanged for a more pertinent attack or camouflage.
For instance, in an image recommendation system, an image
spammer aims to generate spam images concerning specific
topics such as sceneries targeting to certain users. In this
case, the spammer expects the system classifier could mis-
classify the spam image as a benign object while correctly
classifying it as a scenery image for the purpose of malicious
recommendations [16]. From a benign perspective, the system
administrators could leverage the perturbations to jointly per-
turb some sensitive attributes thus enhance the protection of
users’ privacy via preventing their personal information being
inferred by malicious classifiers [17]. Moreover, multi-label
adversarial examples could also be utilized for adversarial
learning to improve the robustness of multi-label models [18].
Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we propose
to investigate a novel and important problem, i.e., multi-label
adversarial perturbation generation.
Generating targeted multi-label adversarial perturbations
is still a rarely touched and challenging task. First, each
instance might have an uncertain number of labels. It requires
the attacking methods to be sensitive and discriminative in
generating perturbations based on different targets. Second,
coordinating multiple labels is difficult since labels are not
mutually exclusive with each other. It is too arbitrary to
target on a certain single label without considering the rests.
Third, quantifying the attacking performance can be hard since
multiple targeted labels may not be jointly achieved. These
challenges prevent exiting attacking methods from being sim-
ply applied to generate multi-label adversarial perturbations.
To tackle these challenges, in this paper, we propose a gen-
eral attacking framework targeting on multi-label classification
models, and conduct premier analysis on the perturbations
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for deep neural networks. Leveraging the ranking relation-
ships among labels, we further introduce a ranking-based
framework to attack multi-label ranking models. Through
exploring the attacking performance targeting on manipulating
different labels, we empirically validate the effectiveness of
our frameworks and provide evidence for the vulnerability
of multi-label deep learning models. Specifically, we aim to
answer the following questions: (1) How to generate multi-
label adversarial perturbations? (2) What is the performance
of the generated perturbations based on different attacking
strategies? The main contributions are summarized as follows:
• Formally define multi-label adversarial examples;
• Propose a general framework and two corresponding
methods to generate targeted multi-label adversarial per-
turbations for multi-label classification;
• Propose a variation framework and two corresponding
methods targeting on attacking multi-label ranking;
• Examine the vulnerability of deep models in multi-label
learning using various attacking methods and strategies.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notations: Assume we have a multi-label classification prob-
lem with l labels. Let x ∈ Rd×1 and y ∈ {−1, 1}l×1 denote
the feature vector and label vector of an instance, respectively.
In general, multi-label classification algorithms provide two
types of outputs, either binary values that assign concrete
relationships between instances and labels or confidence scores
indicating the relevance of each instance with labels. We use
function H : Rd → {−1, 1}l to denote a multi-label classifier
which generates the first-type outputs, and F : Rd → Rl
to denote a multi-label predictor which predicts continuous
relevance scores corresponding to the second-type outputs.
Both H and F can be decomposed as n sub-functions, i.e.,
H = {h1, . . . , hl} and F = {f1, . . . , fl}, where hj(x)
and fj(x) indicate their predictions of yj . Based on certain
classification thresholds, it is easy to induce H from F ,
e.g., hj(x) = IJfj(x)>tj(x)K − IJfj(x)<tj(x), where IJ·K is an
indicator function. Following the notations, we formally define
two categories of multi-label adversarial examples.
Given an instance x, let H be a classifier satisfying H(x) =
y, where y is the ground truth labels of x. Here, we assume
that H can correctly classify all labels of x. Though it may not
be true in practice, one could simply achieve this by limiting
L to cover only the labels that H correctly classifies x into.
Then we have the following two cases:
A Non-targeted Multi-label Adversarial Example of H
around x is defined as an instance x∗ that satisfies:
1. x∗ is close to x under a certain distance measure;
2. x∗ has the same ground truth labels with x;
3. H(x∗) 6= y, i.e., ∃i ∈ L such that hi(x∗) 6= yi.
A Targeted Multi-label Adversarial Example of H around
x is defined as an instance x∗ that satisfies:
1. x∗ is close to x under a certain distance measure;
2. x∗ has the same ground truth labels with x;
3. Given label sets A and B, ha(x∗) 6= ya,∀a ∈ A;
hb(x∗) = yb,∀b ∈ B. (A 6= ∅, A ∪B ⊂ L, A ∩B = ∅)
The first two characteristics for both categories of ex-
amples are motivated by the existing work with multi-class
settings [1]–[3], [11]. Both of them indicate that the difference
between an adversarial example and the original example
should be indistinguishable for humans, i.e., the perturbation
should be small. From the last characteristics, we can see
that for non-targeted adversarial examples, there is no specific
label that we target to manipulate which is similar to the non-
targeted attack in multi-class cases; but for targeted examples,
two label sets A and B are specified corresponding to the
labels we intend to vary and the labels we expect to fix. This
definition is motivated by the observations that, in practice,
attackers are often only interested in attacking a specific set
of labels (i.e., A) while keeping another specific set of labels
(i.e., B) for a more pertinent attack or camouflage. Moreover,
as each label is binary, there is no need to specify the values
we aim to achieve for each ha(x∗), a ∈ A. In the rest of
the paper, we will focus on investigating the targeted multi-
label adversarial examples, since they are more practical and
meaningful in real-world systems. For the ease of presentation,
we use “adversarial example generation” and “adversarial
perturbation generation” interchangeably.
III. TARGETED MULTI-LABEL ADVERSARIAL
PERTURBATION GENERATION
To cope with general multi-label settings while conducting
effective attacks, we propose two joint attacking frameworks
towards attacking multi-label learning models with classifi-
cation and ranking purposes, respectively. We first introduce
a general classification-targeted framework, which aims to
manipulate a specific set of predicted labels in the multi-label
classification problem. The key idea is to construct a new
classification problem by reversing the relationship between
instances and classifiers, and generate perturbations through
optimization. Motivated by the broad applications of multi-
label ranking techniques, we then tailor the framework towards
a ranking-targeted framework to attack models with ranking
purpose. The core idea is to rerank the predicted scores based
on the targeted labels to construct a new multi-label ranking
problem. For both frameworks, we separately design two
specific methods in subsequent sections.
A. The General Frameworks of the Classification-targeted and
Ranking-targeted Attacks
In this section, we introduce the two types of frameworks we
proposed for attacking multi-label classification models and
multi-label ranking models, respectively.
1) Type I. Classification-targeted Framework: We first in-
vestigate generating adversarial examples for multi-label clas-
sification models. Since each label is either −1 or 1, for a
targeted classifier H and a benign instance x, our goal can be
mathematically formulated as follows,
minimize
r
‖r‖
subject to ha(x+ r) = −ya, a ∈ A,
hb(x+ r) = yb, b ∈ B,
(1)
TABLE I: Two divisions of labels of the target sample x.
Ground Truth
Division
Attack Division
A B C = L \ A ∪ B
Y1 = {yi|yi = 1, i ∈ L} A1 B1 C1
Y−1 = {yi|yi = −1, i ∈ L} A−1 B−1 C−1
where r is the expected perturbation. x∗ = x + r is the
generated adversarial example. ‖ · ‖ denotes a certain norm
which is usually defined as the Lp norm, where p is chosen
based on specific settings or demands [11].
2) Type II. Ranking-targeted Framework: Existing work on
the ranking-based prediction techniques has demonstrated their
effectiveness in both multi-label classification and ranking
tasks [19], [20]. It motivates us to explore the correspond-
ing adversarial examples to evaluate the robustness of these
models. A straightforward way to attack them is to generate
examples based on our first type of framework. However, two
problems may perplex it. (1) Soft thresholds: since ranking-
based models aim at producing ranking relationships among
labels, no hard thresholds need to be specified. (2) Label
relationships: the classification-targeted framework does not
explicitly take the relationships among labels into account
which may not be generalizable for attacking ranking-based
algorithms. To tackle the issues, we propose a ranking-targeted
framework. Mathematically, given a predictor F , we target at,
minimize
r
‖r‖
subject to fα(x + r) ≤ fγ(x + r) ≤ fβ(x + r),
∀α ∈ A1 ∪B−1, β ∈ A−1 ∪B1, γ ∈ C.
(2)
These constraints are motivated by two divisions of the
whole label set L based on the target instance x and the
attacking strategy. As shown in Table I, the header sets of
the row and column represents the two types of divisions,
i.e., the first column denotes a division using the ground truth
labels of instance x and the first row denotes a division using
the attacking sets A and B. Each grid in the table denotes
the intersection of corresponding header sets of its row and
column, e.g., A1 = A∩Y1. Labels in the set A−1∪B1 should
be positive after attacking, and labels in the set A1 ∪ B−1
should be negative. The predictions of the unconcerned labels
γ ∈ C are put in the middle to reinforce the attacking ability.
It could accentuate the ranking gap between labels on the
two sides of the inequality. This constraint may become pretty
harsh especially when |A|+ |B|  |C|, where | · | represents
the number of elements in a given set. To obtain relatively
mild constraints, we can limit γ within other label sets such
as C−1, C1, or ∅, or directly fix a hard threshold.
3) Connection of the Two Frameworks: The proposed two
frameworks are highly connected with each other. Comparing
Equation (1) and (2), if we replace the soft thresholds fγ(x+r),
with hard classification thresholds, then these two types of
frameworks are equivalent to each other. This means Type
II framework could be more general if we do not know
the specific classification thresholds under partially black-box
settings. By contrast, the Type I framework directly takes the
classification thresholds into account. Thus, if we conduct a
pure white-box attack on multi-label classification algorithms
and do not use hard thresholds in Type II framework, the Type
I framework may achieve better performance since it takes
more accurate classification thresholds into account. Based
on these two types of frameworks, now we propose several
attacking methods.
B. Type I. Attack Multi-label Classification
In this section, we propose two attacking methods based
on the Type I framework. To avoid the intricacy induced by
classification thresholds, we fix certain thresholds and express
the constraints using predictor F . For example, for a linear
predictor F (x), the corresponding classifier can be induced
with threshold 0 as H(x) = sgn(F (x)), where sgn(·) is
the signum function. So the constraints in Equation (1) are
equivalent to Equation (3a). For a neural network with sigmoid
output layer and 0.5 threshold (i.e., H(x) = sgn(F (x)−0.5)),
the equivalent constraints are described in Equation (3b).
yafi(x+ r) ≤ 0, − ybfb(x+ r) ≤ 0; (3a)
yafi(x+ r) ≤ 0.5ya, − ybfb(x+ r) ≤ −0.5yb. (3b)
Therefore, Equation (1) could be transformed as follows:
minimize
r
‖r‖
subject to y′  F ′(x+ r) ≤ c,
(4)
where y′ = [ya1 , . . . , ya|A| ,−yb1 , . . . ,−yb|B| ]> and F ′ =
[fa1 , . . . , fa|A| , fb1 , . . . , fb|B| ]
>.  is the Hadamard product.
Vector c ∈ R|A|+|B| is defined based on the thresholds,
targeted labels, and the predictor model we attack, e.g., c = 0
represents linear predictors with threshold 0.
1) Multi-label Carlini & Wagner Attack (ML-CW): A
straightforward way to solve Equation (4) is to convert the
constraints to regularizers such as using the hinge loss:
minimize
r
‖r‖+ λ
|A|+|B|∑
i=1
max(0,y′iF
′
i (x+ r)− ci), (5)
where λ is a trade-off penalty between the perturbation size
and attacking accuracy. The hinge loss is chosen here to
provide a soft margin for each constraint, which has been
proved to be effective in multi-class attacking [11]. Since we
target on the white-box attack here, the optimization can be
done based on the algorithms we target on attacking, e.g.,
gradient decent methods for neural networks. To alleviate
the influence of the hyperparameter selection, we employ
the binary search approach [11] to select λ. In each binary
search iteration, λ is either magnified decuple or shrunk by
half depending on whether the attack is successful or not.
We choose the best perturbation, which satisfies the largest
number of constraints in Equation (4). If two perturbations
satisfy the same number of constraints, the one that has a
smaller distortion is better.
Algorithm 1: Multi-label DeepFool Attack (ML-DP)
Input: x, predictor F , classifier H , target label sets A
and B, maxiter.
Output: r∗, x∗.
1 Initialize the best adversarial example as: x∗ = x;
2 Initialize x0 = x, r0 = 0, and i = 0;
3 Define F ′, y′ and c based on the inputs;
4 while i ≤ maxiter do
5 Calculate P(xi) and q(xi) based on Equation (7);
6 ∆r = P(xi)(P(xi)
>P(xi))−1q(xi);
7 // Update current adversarial example & perturbation:
8 xi+1 = xi + ri, ri+1 = ri + ∆r;
9 // Find the sets of constraints that xi+1 and x∗
satisfy in Equation (4):
10 Csti = {k|y′k~F ′k(xi+1) ≤ ck, k ∈ 1, . . . , |A|+|B|};
11 Cstb = {k|y′k ~ F ′k(x∗) ≤ ck, k ∈ 1, . . . , |A|+ |B|};
12 if |Csti| > |Cstb| then
13 x∗ = xi, r∗ = ri;
14 else if |Csti| = |Cstb| & ‖xi‖2 < ‖x∗‖2 then
15 x∗ = xi, r∗ = ri;
16 i = i+ 1;
17 return r∗, x∗.
2) Multi-label DeepFool Attack (ML-DP): Considering the
high nonlinearity of the constraints, a variation of solving
Equation (4) is to utilize the linear approximation of F ′ to
linearized the constraints as:
minimize
r
‖r‖
subject to y′  [F ′(x) + (∂F
′
∂x
)>r] ≤ c,
(6)
where ∂F
′
∂x = [
∂fa1
∂x , . . . ,
∂fa|A|
∂x ,
∂fb1
∂x , . . . ,
∂fb|B|
∂x ] ∈
Rd×(|A|+|B|). Similar linearization of constraints have been
proved to be effective in the multi-class attacking [12]. How-
ever, generalizing them to the multi-label attack is not straight-
forward since multiple labels bring more complex restrictions
to the perturbation r. We provides a simple approach here by
greedily solving a set of underdetermined linear equations. It is
easy to see that the above problem is equivalent to minimizing
r under a set of linear constraints with varying coefficients:
minimize
r
‖r‖22
subject to P(x)>r ≤ q(x),
(7)
where P(x) = (1d×y′>) ∂F
′(x)
∂x and q(x) = c−y′F ′(x).
Here we measure the perturbation with L2 norm for its
simplicity and generality. The optimization is quite difficult
because P(x) and q(x) vary with the changing of the
perturbation. As feature dimension d is usually larger than
the number of labels l, i.e., d  |A| + |B|, the system
is underdetermined for any fixed coefficients. Since in each
iteration, the coefficients are uncorrelated with the current sub-
perturbation r, we propose to solve it in a greedy manner using
a pseudo-inverse of P(x). The whole algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. We first define F ′(x), y′, and c based on the
inputs, and then greedily solve the underdetermined linear
system with varying coefficients. After updating the current
adversarial example xi+1 and the perturbation ri+1 in each
iteration, we decide whether accepting xi+1 and ri+1 or not
based on the constraints in Equation (4) that xi+1 and x∗
satisfy, i.e., Csti and Cstb. It should be noted that this
greedy algorithm does not guarantee a convergence to the
optimal perturbation and may even not converge. Thus, we
fix the maximum number of iterations and select the optimal
perturbations by jointly consider the number of constraints
they satisfied and the size of their distortions.
C. Type II. Attack Multi-label Ranking
In this section, we propose two more methods leveraging the
relationships among labels based on the Type II framework.
This type of attack is a more general ranking-based attack
leveraging the relationships among labels.
1) Rank I Attack: Assume Ω− = A1 ∪ B−1, Ω+ =
A−1 ∪ B1, and Ω◦ = C. Motivated by the empirical multi-
label ranking loss in [21], we proposed to minimize the
average fraction of misordered label pairs. By adopting hinge
loss similar to ML-CW, an alternative loss function can be
formulated as:
L0 = ‖r‖+
1
|Ω−||Ω+|
∑
(α,β)∈Ω−×Ω+
max(0, e
fα(x+r) − efβ(x+r))
+
1
|Ω−||Ω◦|
∑
(α,γ)∈Ω−×Ω◦
max(0, e
fα(x+r) − efγ (x+r))
+
1
|Ω◦||Ω+|
∑
(γ,β)∈Ω◦×Ω+
max(0, e
fγ (x+r) − efβ(x+r)).
(8)
The exponential function is chosen to severely penalize the
ranking errors inspired by [22]. When the number of labels is
large, computing this equation would be time-consuming. To
reduce the time complexity without losing much attack power,
Equation (8) could be simplified by extracting the maximum
and minimum predictions of labels in each label set as follows:
L1 = ‖r‖+ λ1 max(0, max
α∈Ω−
efα(x+r) − min
β∈Ω+
efβ(x+r))
+ λ2 max(0, max
α∈Ω−
efα(x+r) − min
γ∈Ω◦
efγ(x+r))
+ λ3 max(0,max
γ∈Ω◦
efγ(x+r) − min
β∈Ω+
efβ(x+r)),
(9)
where λi(i = 1, 2, 3) are hyperparameters that make a trade-
off among terms. This loss function could be further simplified
based on the choice of Ω◦. If Ω◦ 6= ∅, the first term could be
reduced; otherwise the last two terms are nonexistent.
2) Rank II Attack: Though to some extent, Rank I attack
takes the label correlation into account, it may not be sensitive
enough in certain cases. For example, if we have a benign
instance x with ground truth labels [−1, 1, 1]> and targeted
attacking labels [−1,−1, 1]>, the label probabilities predicted
by the predictor F could be [0.01, 0.98, 0.99]>. In this case,
Rank I cannot provide successful attack since Equation (9) is
equal to 0 for the benign instance x and no loss is suffered.
This problem comes from the rank-constraint of the general
TABLE II: Dataset statistics.
# of Labels Retraining + Validation Testing
VOC 2007 20 5011 4952
VOC 2012 20 5717 5823
framework defined in Equation (2). Based on this constraint,
no discrimination is made for labels in set Ω− = A1 ∪ B−1.
Similar situation happens for Ω+ = A−1 ∪ B1. To solve this
problem, we add two more constraints defined as follows:
fα1(x + r) ≤ fα2(x + r), ∀α1 ∈ A1, α2 ∈ B−1,
fβ1(x + r) ≤ fβ2(x + r), ∀β1 ∈ B1, β2 ∈ A−1.
(10)
The first constraint forces the probabilities of newly added
negative labels to be smaller than all negative labels, while
the second highlights the new positive labels. Leveraging the
two constraints, the loss of Rank II attack is defined as:
L2 = L1 + λ4 max(0, max
α1∈A1
efα(x+r) − min
α2∈B−1
efβ(x+r))
+ λ5 max(0, max
β1∈B1
efβ(x+r) − min
β2∈A−1
efβ(x+r)),
(11)
where L1 is the loss function of Rank I attack. Similar to
ML-CW, we use binary search for both Rank I and Rank
II to determine a suitable λi. All the λi are defined as the
same in the experiments for simplicity. To select the best
perturbation, after finding the optimal perturbation rλ and its
corresponding adversarial example x∗λ for each λ, we utilize
Kendall τb ranking correlation coefficient [23] to quantify
the similarity between the new label prediction y∗λ and a
criterion vector yτ ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}l×1. yτ is defined
based on the rank constraints in Equations (2) and (10), i.e.,
for any i = 1, 2, . . . , l, yτi = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2 correspond
to i ∈ A1, B−1, C,B1, A−1, respectively. The higher the
similarity is, the better the perturbation fits the constraints.
If two perturbations have the same τb score, the smaller one
would be selected.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed
attacking methods and explore the generated perturbations
targeting on different labels. Three major aspects are analyzed:
Q1: What is the general performance of different methods?
Q2: What is the performance of different attacking methods
with specified targeted labels?
Q3: What are the characteristics of the generated multi-label
adversarial perturbations?
A. Datasets
The experiments are conducted on two different multi-
label image datasets, i.e., PASCAL VOC 2007 [24] and VOC
2012 [25]. Both of them are benchmark datasets, which are
widely adopted in various multi-label classification/ranking
work [26]–[28]. Table II shows the basic statistics two datasets.
For VOC 2012, we split the original training set into the
retraining and validation sets, and use the original validation
TABLE III: Original accuracy of model to be attacked.
Hamming macro/micro-F1 Ranking Loss mAP
VOC 2007 0.0504 0.7278/0.7182 0.0175 0.9239
VOC 2012 0.0491 0.7340/0.7252 0.0166 0.9320
set as the testing set since the ground truth labels of the
original testing images are not officially provided.
B. Targeted Multi-label Learning Model
We focus on attacking deep neural networks given its
superior performance in multi-label learning [28]–[30] and
vulnerability to adversarial examples [1]. The classifiers (and
predictors) are built upon the Inception v3 network [31]
pre-trained on ImageNet dataset [32]. Since inception v3 is
constructed for multi-class classification, it cannot be directly
applied to multi-label cases. Thus, we use a similar idea
described in [27] to retrain the model by replacing softmax
layers with sigmoid classification layers. To ensure prediction
performance, both the instance-wise and label-wise losses
are considered [33]. We combine the instance-wise ranking
loss motivated by the widely used multi-label neural network
BPMLL [22], and the label-wise AUC score [33] to build up
the loss function as follows:
J = λ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1
|Y +i· ||Y −i· |
∑
(p,q)∈Y +i· ×Y
−
i·
exp(fq(xi)− fp(xi))
+
1
l
l∑
j=1
1
|Y +·j ||Y −·j |
∑
(p,q)∈Y +·j ×Y
−
·j
exp(fj(xq)− fj(xp)).
(12)
The first term is the modified instance-AUC score used in
BPMLL, where Y +i· = {j|yij = 1} and Y −i· = {j|yij = −1}.
This term is used to extract label relationships for each
instance. The second term is the label-wise ranking score,
where Y +·j = {i|yij = 1} and Y −·j = {i|yij = −1}. This
term is used to alleviate the label-imbalance problem existed
in both of the datasets. The trade-off parameter λ is chosen to
be 0.5 in our experiments based on the validation dataset. We
select the batch-size to be 100. After the retraining process,
the final testing performance regarding five commonly used
measures [33] is reported in Table III. Partial retraining details
are referred to [34]. It is worth noted that we do not focus on
attacking some conventional multi-label classification models
such as Binary Relevance [35] here due to the fact that:
they are both label transformation based method, which could
be separated as several uncorrelated multi-class classification
components and easily attacked by traditional multi-class
attacking methods. Also, as this is a very early work on
attacking multi-label learning algorithms, we intend to use the
state-of-the-art and most representative methods and leave the
rest for future exploration.
C. Attacking Methods
Besides the four proposed iterative methods, to give a
more comprehensive analysis of different types of multi-label
attacking methods, we extend two widely adopted multi-class
attacking methods into multi-label settings and summarize all
six methods analyzed in our experiments as follows:
• Targeted Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGS) [2]: We
extend this multi-class attacking method to multi-label
setting via the following equation:
x∗ ← clip(x−  · sgn(∇xloss(−y′, H ′(x)))),
where  is the hyperparameter controlling the distortion
under the L∞ norm. clip(x) is utilized to clip each pixel
of the images to the range of [0, 255]. y′ is the vector
defined in Equation (4), H ′ is the classifier corresponding
to the predictor F ′ define in Equation (4). The Loss is
defined as sigmoid loss for each label.
• Targeted Fast Gradient Method (FG): A variation of
FGS using L2 normalization as follows:
x∗ ← clip(x−  · ∇xloss(−y
′, H ′(x))
‖∇xloss(−y′, H ′(x))‖2 ).
• ML-CW: Our multi-label extension of Carlini & Wagner
multi-class targeted attack based on Equation (5). L2
norm is applied.
• ML-DP: Our extension of DeepFool on multi-label ad-
versarial attacks with Algorithm 1.
• Rank I: The simplified ranking-based method based on
Equation (9). L2 norm is applied to the distortion term.
• Rank II: A more sensitive ranking-based attack based on
Equation (11). L2 norm is applied to the distortion term.
Parameter Setting: Since binary search is applied for ML-
CW, Rank I, and Rank II to find the suitable trade-off param-
eter λ, we set the initial λ as 105 and apply the binary search
ten times. For each searched λ, the maximum iteration for
finding the corresponding perturbation is set as 1000. Learning
rate is set as 10−2. To avoid the optimization getting stuck in
extreme spots, we follow the similar image preprocessing and
variable transformation methods discussed in [11]. For ML-
DP, the maximum iteration is set as twenty to prevent over
distortion. For FGS and FG, the hyperparameter  is searched
between [0, 10], and defined as the value which result the best
attacking performance in different scenarios.
D. Evaluation Metrics
Three types of metrics are employed. Distortion: root
mean square deviation (RMSD) [3] is used to measure the
perturbation sizes. For each method, we report the RMSD,
which could result in the best general performance of the
classification and ranking tasks. Classification: we set the
classification threshold as 0.5 for each label, i.e., hi(x∗) = 1
if fi(x∗) ≥ 0.5. The classification performance is measured
by Hamming Loss and instance-F1 score (F1) [33]. Hamming
loss is applied on two targeted label sets A and B. Since we
focus on targeted attacks, the targeted labels are considered as
the ground truth in classification attacks. Ranking: the ranking
performance is measured by four metrics, i.e., Ranking Loss,
mean average precision (mAP), instance average area under
curve (AUC), and Kendall τb rank correlation coefficient. For
clarity, an arrow sign ↑ or ↓, is annotated behind each metric
in tables indicating the higher the better (↑), or the lower
the better (↓). It is worth pointing that we control the upper
bound of the RMSD to search the best perturbations for all the
methods in order to give a fair comparison on the classification
and ranking performance.
E. Experimental Settings
To give a relatively comprehensive evaluation of six attack-
ing methods, different combinations of attacking labels are
chosen. For each dataset, we fix the classification threshold as
0.5 and collect target attacking images into a set X . Every
label of these images should be correctly classified by H . The
attacking strategies employed in two parts of our experiments
are introduced respectively as follows.
General Attacking: we first try two types of attacking strate-
gies to test the general performance of all methods:
• Random Case: Randomly select 1000 images from X .
For each image x, randomly select one positive and one
negative label from sets Y1 and Y−1 defined in Table I
as the targeted changing set A, and put the rest in B.
• Extreme Case: Randomly select 1000 images from X .
For each image, the goal is to change all labels, i.e., A =
L and B = ∅.
Label Specified Attacking: In the second part of the exper-
iment, two more strategies are used to evaluate six methods
on attacking specific labels. To avoid lacking of test examples
caused by label imbalance, we choose the highest contained
label “person” as the targeted reduced label and augment the
lowest contained label “sheep”:
• Person Reduction (Person): Randomly select 100 im-
ages from X . Each image should have at least two
positive labels and one of them should be “person”. Set
A = {person} and B = L \ {person}.
• Sheep Augmentation (Sheep): Randomly select 100
images from set X . Each of them should not have label
“sheep”. Set A = {sheep} and B = L \ {sheep}.
F. General Attacking Performance
We first compare the performance of all six methods with
general attacking strategies. From results shown in Table IV,
the main observations are described as follows.
Distortion Analysis. We observe that: (1) ML-CW method
provides the best RMSD in the “Random Case”, but becomes
worse than Rank I and Rank II in “Extreme Case”. This
is because the classification constraints used by ML-CW is
easier to achieve than ranking-based constraints when the
number of labels we need to change, i.e., |A|, is small, but
will become much harder to achieve when |A| is large. (2)
The sizes of the perturbations generated by Rank I & II are
relatively stable in both cases. It is because the ranking-based
attacks only care about the ranking relationships among labels
without considering specific classification threshold. When |A|
is small, this might be harder to achieve compared with the
classification constraints used by ML-CW and will cause the
distortion to be larger. But when |A| is large as in the “Extreme
TABLE IV: General performance of all six methods with different attacking strategies in terms of three types of measurements.
Distortion Classification Ranking
Metrics RMSD ↓ Hamming (A) ↓ Hamming (B) ↓ F1 ↑ Ranking Loss ↓ mAP ↑ AUC ↑ Kendall τb ↑
V
O
C
2007
Random
Case,
|A| = 2,
|B| = 18
FGS 5.9271 0.9045 0.0064 0.1420 0.4113 0.2709 0.5887 0.0711
FG 5.8718 0.9100 0.0183 0.1587 0.4304 0.2741 0.5696 0.0670
ML-CW 2.4452 0.0500 0.0039 0.9253 0.0013 0.9917 0.9987 0.3571
ML-DP 11.0673 0.7145 0.0084 0.1198 0.4748 0.2243 0.5252 0.0269
Rank I 3.2108 0.1900 0.0417 0.6610 0.0087 0.9308 0.9913 0.3520
Rank II 5.2193 0.0000 0.0056 0.9700 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3580
Extreme
Case,
|A| = 20,
|B| = 0
FGS 9.8397 0.9425 N.A. 0.0779 0.9591 0.7799 0.0409 −0.4026
FG 8.1945 0.9440 N.A. 0.0677 0.9529 0.7797 0.0471 −0.3970
ML-CW 9.1861 0.5505 N.A. 0.5419 0.1413 0.9816 0.8587 0.3149
ML-DP 19.2335 0.9160 N.A. 0.0752 0.8878 0.7971 0.1122 −0.3405
Rank I 3.9147 0.8450 N.A. 0.1069 0.0692 0.9923 0.9308 0.3777
Rank II 6.2860 0.8760 N.A. 0.0458 0.0675 0.9924 0.9325 0.3793
Random
Case,
|A| = 2,
|B| = 18
FGS 5.9365 0.9400 0.0117 0.1663 0.4231 0.2827 0.5769 0.0725
V
O
C
2012
FG 5.8904 0.8900 0.0083 0.1374 0.4183 0.2653 0.5817 0.0662
ML-CW 2.3928 0.0165 0.0008 0.9746 0.0003 0.9972 0.9997 0.3443
ML-DP 10.2170 0.8750 0.0194 0.1393 0.4866 0.2275 0.5134 0.0232
Rank I 4.1550 0.2010 0.0328 0.6180 0.0041 0.9789 0.9959 0.3416
Rank II 5.3902 0.0090 0.0020 0.9741 0.0001 0.9993 0.9999 0.3445
Extreme
Case,
|A| = 20,
|B| = 0
FGS 9.8387 0.9420 N.A. 0.0881 0.9427 0.8548 0.0573 −0.3046
FG 8.3135 0.9460 N.A. 0.0765 0.9383 0.8562 0.0617 −0.3023
ML-CW 9.9749 0.0520 N.A. 0.9684 0.0120 0.9993 0.9880 0.3383
ML-DP 20.5351 0.9120 N.A. 0.0943 0.8648 0.8784 0.1352 −0.2477
Rank I 2.8764 0.8965 N.A. 0.0806 0.0071 0.9996 0.9929 0.3419
Rank II 4.8311 0.9030 N.A. 0.0675 0.0066 0.9996 0.9934 0.3422
Case”, the soft ranking thresholds would become milder than
hard classification thresholds. (3) ML-DP generates the largest
perturbations in all cases because multiple linear constraints
are hard to be jointly accommodated in multi-label settings.
Attack Classification. From the results measured by three
classification metrics, we can see that: (1) Two one-step meth-
ods FG and FGS do not perform well. This shows that one-
shot methods are not good at generating multi-label adversarial
examples. (2) In general, ML-CW performs the best among
all six methods. Rank II performs comparably well in the
“Random Case”, but becomes worse in the “Extreme Case”.
This is because the ranking-based methods do not consider
the hard classification threshold 0.5 during the optimization
while ML-CW does on the contrary. It should be noted
that this does not mean Rank II cannot perform well in
this case. As mentioned in Section III-A2, Rank II could
also take the classification thresholds into account by setting
fixed thresholds in the constraints. (3) Rank II outperforms
Rank I in the “Random Case”, but becomes slightly worse
in the “Extreme Case”. By comparing their loss functions,
we know that Rank II has more constraints in discriminating
the labels within sets Ω−1 and Ω+. However, more ranking
constraints bring more soft thresholds, which make it worse
in the “Extreme Case”.
Attack Ranking. Three main observations can be summarized
from Table IV. (1) FG and FGS cannot provide satisfying
attacks due to their poor capacities in accommodating multiple
labels. (2) Rank II outperforms all other methods. Comparing
with Rank I, it enjoys more hierarchies among labels which
could be reflected by the Kendall τb metric. (3) ML-CW
performs well in general. However, it requires larger distor-
tion to achieve comparable performance with ranking-based
approaches in the “Extreme Case”.
G. Label Specified Attacking Performance
We now adopt two more specific attacking strategies, which
has been introduced Section IV-E, i.e., “Person Reduction” and
“Sheep Augmentation”, to provide a more exquisite evaluation.
We focus on the best three methods ML-CW, Rank I, and
Rank II and describe the results in in Table V. To give a
more visualized comparison, we also display four probability
distributions of the two target labels of all adversarial images
generated by different methods in Fig. 1. The X-axis represents
the predictions of “person” or “sheep”. The Y-axis denotes the
number of images. Based on Table V and Fig. 1, we analyze
the three methods in turn.
ML-CW. Two major observations are found. (1) ML-CW
performs well in both cases since the number of labels we
want to vary (i.e., |A|) is small. (2) As shown in Fig. 1, ML-
CW successfully decreases the “person” predictions of most
images below the classification threshold 0.5, and increases the
predictions of “sheep” beyond 0.5. However, the mean values
of the distributions in both cases are close to 0.5 because ML-
CW only considers the linear error between predictions and
the thresholds, which lacks discriminative power.
Rank I Attack. From Table V, we find that the perturbations
generated by Rank I are pretty small in “person” case. This
validates our discussion in Section III-C2, i.e., as long as
“person” ranks lower than other originally positive labels and
higher than the rests, the optimization will stop, which causes
the distortion being small but the probability of “person”
remaining high. This explanation can be further verified by
TABLE V: Performance of the best three methods for label specified attacking on the VOC 2007 dataset.
Distortion Classification Ranking
Metrics RMSD ↓ Hamming (A) ↓ Hamming (B) ↓ F1 ↑ Ranking Loss ↓ mAP ↑ AUC ↑ Kendall τb ↑
Person,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.5735 0.0700 0.0032 0.9300 0.0005 0.9950 0.9995 0.3195
Rank I 0.1382 0.9800 0.0116 0.6432 0.0021 0.9800 0.9979 0.3185
Rank II 5.2107 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3198
Sheep,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.9293 0.0800 0.0032 0.9690 0.0008 0.9942 0.9992 0.4613
Rank I 3.0393 0.8300 0.0042 0.7360 0.0037 0.9817 0.9963 0.4586
Rank II 3.4916 0.1500 0.0184 0.8112 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4620
TABLE IV: Label specified attack performance on VOC 2007.
Distortion Classification Ranking
Metrics RMSD # Hamming (A / B) # mAP "
Person,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.5735 0.0700 / 0.0032 0.9950
Rank I 0.1382 0.9800 / 0.0116 0.9800
Rank II 5.2107 0.0000 / 0.0000 1.0000
Sheep,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.9293 0.0800 / 0.0032 0.9942
Rank I 3.0393 0.8300 / 0.0042 0.9817
Rank II 3.4916 0.1500 / 0.0184 1.0000
We focus on the best three methods ML-CW, Rank I, and
Rank II. Since different metrics reflect similar conclusions, we
only report several representative ones in Table IV for space
limitation. To give a more visualized comparison, we display
four probability distributions of the two target labels of all
adversarial images generated by different methods in Fig. 1.
The X-axis represents the predictions of “person” or “sheep”.
The Y-axis denotes the number of images. Based on Table IV
and Fig. 1, we analyze the three methods in turn.
ML-CW. Two major observations are found. (1) ML-CW
performs well in both cases since the number of labels we
want to vary (i.e., |A|) is small. (2) As shown in Fig. 1, ML-
CW successfully decreases the “person” predictions of most
images below the classification threshold 0.5, and increases the
predictions of “sheep” beyond 0.5. However, the mean values
of the distributions in both cases are close to 0.5 because ML-
CW only considers the linear error between predictions and
the thresholds, which lacks discriminative power.
Rank I Attack. From Table IV, we find that the perturbations
generated by Rank I are pretty small in “person” case. This
validates our discussion in Section III-C2, i.e., as long as
“person” ranks lower than other originally positive labels and
higher than the rests, the optimization will stop, which causes
the distortion being small but the probability of “person”
remaining high. This explanation can be further verified by
Fig. 1. For both cases, the predictions of the adversarial images
generated by Rank I (red bars) have high overlap with the
predictions of the original images (blue bars).
Rank II Attack. Two main conclusions are drawn. (1) In
Fig. 1, Rank II not only successfully decreases the predic-
tions of “person” below the classification threshold, but also
induces a huge discrimination between the mean value and the
classification threshold. Similar results happen in the “sheep”
case. (2) For the classification attack, Rank II performs better
in eliminating “person” than augmenting “sheep”. The reason
is that every image in the dataset has much more negative
labels than positive ones. Due to the lack of positive labels,
during the optimization process in “sheep” attack, it is hard
to guarantee that there will always be some labels whose
predicted probabilities are larger than 0.5. Thus, even “sheep”
ranks the highest among all labels, its prediction may still be
smaller than 0.5 with high probability.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we focus on generating multi-label adversar-
ial examples and propose two general frameworks targeting
on attacking multi-label classification and ranking models,
respectively. For each type of the framework, we propose
Fig. 1: Performance on attacking person and sheep labels.
two specific methods. Experiments with different attacking
strategies on deep neural networks validate the effectiveness of
our proposed methods and the vulnerability of multi-label deep
models. Further theoretical analysis on different perturbations
may enhance the interpretability and security of multi-label
learning models, which is intriguing for future exploration.
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TABLE IV: Label specified attack performance on VOC 2007.
Distortion Classification Ranking
Metrics RMSD # Hamming (A / B) # mAP "
Person,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.5735 0.0700 / 0.0032 0.9950
Rank I 0.1382 0.9800 / 0.0116 0.9800
Rank II 5.2107 0.0000 / 0.0000 1.0000
Sheep,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.9293 0.0800 / 0.0032 0.9942
Rank I 3.0393 0.8300 / 0.0042 0.9817
Rank II 3.4916 0.1500 / 0.0184 1.0000
We focus on the best three methods ML-CW, Rank I, and
Rank II. Since different metrics reflect similar conclusions, we
only report several representative ones in Table IV for space
limitation. To give a more visualized comparison, we display
four probability distributions of the two target labels of all
adversarial images generated by different methods in Fig. 1.
The X-axis represents the predictions of “person” or “sheep”.
The Y-axis denotes the number of images. Based on Table IV
and Fig. 1, we analyze the three methods in turn.
ML-CW. Two major observations are found. (1) ML-CW
performs well in both cases since the number of labels we
want to vary (i.e., |A|) is small. (2) As shown in Fig. 1, ML-
CW successfully decreases the “person” predictions of most
images below the classification threshold 0.5, and increases the
predictions of “sheep” beyond 0.5. However, the mean values
of the distributions in both cases are close to 0.5 because ML-
CW only considers the linear error between predictions and
the thresholds, which lacks discriminative power.
Rank I Attack. From Table IV, we find that the perturbations
generated by Rank I are pretty small in “person” case. This
validates our discussion in Section III-C2, i.e., as long as
“person” ranks lower than other originally positive labels and
higher than the rests, the optimization will stop, which causes
the distortion being small but the probability of “person”
remaining high. This explanation can be further verified by
Fig. 1. For both cases, the predictions of the adversarial images
generated by Rank I (red bars) have high overlap with the
predictions of the original images (blue bars).
Rank II Attack. Two main conclusions are drawn. (1) In
Fig. 1, Rank II not only successfully decreases the predic-
tions of “person” below the classification threshold, but also
induces a huge discrimination between the mean value and the
classification threshold. Similar results happen in the “sheep”
case. (2) For the classification attack, Rank II performs better
in eliminating “person” than augmenting “sheep”. The reason
is that every image in the dataset has much more negative
labels than positive ones. Due to the lack of positive labels,
during the optimization process in “sheep” attack, it is hard
to guarantee that there will always be some labels whose
predicted probabilities are larger than 0.5. Thus, even “sheep”
ranks the highest among all labels, its prediction may still be
smaller than 0.5 with high probability.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we focus on generating multi-label adversar-
ial examples and propose two general frameworks targeting
on attacking multi-label classification and ranking models,
respectively. For each type of the framework, we propose
Fig. 1: P rfo m o attacking person and sheep labels.
two spe ifi m t ods. Exp iments with different attacking
strategies n deep neu al etworks validate the effectiveness of
our proposed method an he vulnerability of multi-label deep
models. Further theoretical analysis on different perturbations
may enhance the interpretability and security of multi-label
learning models, which is intriguing for future exploration.
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TABLE IV: Label specified attack performance on VOC 2007.
Distortion Classification Ranking
Metrics RMSD # Hamming (A / B) # mAP "
Person,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.5735 0.0700 / 0.0032 0.9950
Rank I .1382 0.9800 / 0.0116 0.9800
Rank II 5.2107 0.0000 / 0.0000 1.0000
Sheep,
|A| = 1,
|B| = 19
ML-CW 1.9293 0.0800 / 0.0032 0.9942
Rank I 3.0393 0.8300 / 0.0042 0.9817
Rank II 3.4916 0.1500 / 0.0184 1.0000
We focus on the best three me hods ML-CW, Rank I, and
Rank II. S nce different metrics reflect s milar conclusions, we
only report sev ral rep esentative ones in Table IV for space
limitati n. To give a more visualize comparison, we d sp ay
our probability distributions of the two targe labels of ll
adversarial images generated by different methods in Fig. 1.
The X-axis represents t redictions of “person” or “sheep”.
The Y-axis denotes the number of images. Based on Table IV
and Fig. 1, we analyze the three methods in turn.
ML-CW. Two major observations are found. (1) ML-CW
performs well in both cases since the number of labels we
want to vary (i.e., |A|) is small. (2) As shown in Fig. 1, ML-
CW successfully decreases the “person” predictions of most
images below the classifica ion threshol 0 5, and inc eases the
predictions of “sheep” beyond 0.5. However, the mean values
of the distributions in both cases are close to 0.5 because ML-
CW only considers he linear error b een predictions and
the thresholds, which lacks discriminative power.
Rank I Attack. From T ble IV, we find that the perturbations
generated by Rank I are pretty small in “person” case. This
validates our discu sion in Section III-C2, i.e., as long as
“person” rank lower than other originally positive labels and
higher than he rests, the optimization will stop, which causes
the dist rtion being small but the probability of “person”
rem i ing hig . This explanation can be further verified by
Fig. 1. For both cases, the pr dictions of the adversarial images
generated by Rank I (red bars) have high overlap with the
predictions of the original images (blue bars).
Rank II Attack. Two mai conclusions re dr wn. (1) In
Fig. 1, Rank II not only successfully decreases the predic-
tions of “person” below the classification threshold, but also
induces a huge discrimi ation between the mean value and the
classification threshold. Similar results happen in the “sheep”
c se. (2) For the classification attack, Rank II performs better
in liminating “person” than augmenting “sheep”. The reason
i hat every image i the dataset has much more negative
labels than positive ones. Due to the lack of positive labels,
during the op imizat on process in “sheep” att ck, it is h rd
to guarantee that there will always be some labels whose
predicted probabilities are larger than 0.5. Thus, even “sheep”
ranks the h ghest among all labels, its prediction may still be
smaller than 0.5 with high probability.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, w focus on generating multi-label adversar-
ial x mples and propos two general frameworks targeting
on attacking multi-label classification and ranki g models,
respectively. For each type of the framework, we propose
Fig. 1: Performance on attacking person and sheep labels.
two specific methods. Experiments with different attacking
strategies on deep neural networks validate the effectiveness of
our proposed ethods and the vulnerability of multi-label deep
models. Further th oretical analysis on different perturbations
may enhance the interpretability and security of multi-label
learning models, which is intriguing for future exploration.
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We f cus on the best thr e methods ML-CW, Rank I, and
Rank II. Sinc differ nt metrics reflect similar conclusions, we
only report sev ral r presentative ones in Table IV for space
limitati n. To give a more visualized comparison, we display
four probability distributions of the two target labels of all
adversari l images generate by different methods in Fig. 1.
The X-axis r presents the predictions of “person” or “sheep”.
The Y-axis denotes the number of image . Based on Table IV
and Fig. 1, we analyze the three methods in turn.
ML-CW. Two major observations are found. (1) ML-CW
performs well in both cases since the number of lab ls we
want to vary (i.e., |A|) is small. (2) As shown in Fig. 1, ML-
CW uccessfully decreases the “person” predictions f most
images below the classification threshold 0.5, and increases the
predictions of “she p” beyond 0.5. Howev r, the mean values
of the distributions in both cases are close to 0.5 b cause ML-
CW only considers the linear error betwe n predictions and
the thre holds, which lacks discriminative power.
Rank I Attack. From Table IV, we find that the perturbations
generated by Rank I are pretty small in “person” case. This
validates our discussion in Section III-C2, i.e., as long as
“perso ” ranks lower than other originally positive labels and
higher t an the rests, the optimization will stop, which causes
the distortio being small but the probability of “person”
remain ng high. This explanation can be further verified by
Fig. 1. For both cas s, the predictions of th adversarial images
generated by Rank I (red bars) ave high overlap with the
predictions of the origin l images ( lue bars).
Rank II Attack. Two main conclusions are drawn. (1) In
Fig. 1, Rank II ot only uccessfully decreas s the predic-
tions of “person” below the classification threshold, but also
induces a huge discrimination between the mean value and the
classification threshold. Similar results happen in t “sheep”
case. (2) For the classification attack, Rank II performs better
in eliminating “person” than augmenting “sheep”. The reason
is that every image in the dataset has much more negative
labels than positive ones. Due to the lack of positiv labels,
during the optimizati n process in “sheep” attack, it is hard
to guarantee t at there will always be som labels whose
predicted probabilities ar larger than 0.5. Thus, even “sheep”
ranks the highest among all labels, its prediction may still be
smaller than 0.5 wit high probability.
V. ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this pap r, we f cus on ge erating multi-label adversar-
i l examples and propose two general frameworks targeting
on attacking multi-label classification a d ranking models,
respectively. For each type of the framework, we propose
Fig. 1: P rfo ma o attacking person and sheep labels.
two spe ifi m t d . Exp rimen s with different attacking
strat gies n p neu l tworks validat the effectiveness of
our pr pose m t o a he vulnerability of multi-label deep
models. Further theoretical analysis on differ nt perturbations
may enhance the interpretability and security of multi-label
learning models, which is intriguing for future exploration.
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Fig. 1: Performance on attacking person and sheep labels.
Fig. 1. For both cas s, the “person” predictions of the dv r-
sarial images generated by Rank I (r d ars) have high overlap
with the predictions of the original images (blue bars).
Rank II Attack. Two main conclusio s could be drawn as
follows. (1) In Fig. 1, Rank II not only successfully decreases
the predictions of “person” below the classification threshold,
but also induces a huge discrimination between the mean
value and the classification threshold. Similar results happen
in the “sheep” case. (2) For the classification attack, Rank
II performs better in eliminating “person” than augmenting
“sheep”. The reason lies in that every image in the dataset has
much more negative labels than positive ones. Due to the lack
of positive labels, during the optimization process in “sheep”
attack, it is hard to guarantee that there will always be so e
labels whose predicted probabilities are larger than 0.5. Thus,
even “sheep” ranks the highest among all labels, its prediction
may still be smaller than 0.5 with high probability.
H. Discussion
I the section, we introduce two interesting findings, which
c uld potentially benefit the future in-depth analysis of the
in erpret bility and robustnes in multi-label lea ning.
1) Case Study: Fig. 2 c mpares the attacking performance
of ML-CW and Rank II, and their generated perturbations. We
discuss findings one by one corresponding to the four parts
of the figure from left to rig t. First, from the leftmost part, we
can se that the original image has two labels, i.e., “person”
a d “b ttle”. The attacking strategy is to degrade “person”
and highlight “cow” while fixing “bottle” and “sofa”, i.e.,
A = {person, bottle} and B = {cow, sofa}. The remaining
lab ls ar d fi d as set C. Second, the histogr ms in the
s cond p rt compare the predictions of four labels before and
after the attacks. If the classification threshold is 0.5, both
methods would successfully achieve the purpose. However,
Rank II gives higher discrimination (variance) among the four
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Fig. 2: Comparison of the attacking performance and generated
perturbations of ML-CW and Rank II.
labels. Third, if we compare the original image with two
adversarial images, the changes are pretty small and human
imperceptible. It provides the evidence that the multi-label
model we attack is vulnerable and not robust. Fourth, to
give an intuitive visualization of the generated perturbations,
we display the magnified perturbations generated by each
method in the rightmost part. Since the perturbations are
too small to be observed, we first get the absolute value
of each pixel xi and then magnify them by multiplying a
constant 255.0/ ax{xi|i = 1, . . . , d}. As we can see, the
perturbations give a high-level reflection of the original image.
This shows the generative power of adversarial examples
leveraging the adversarial relationship between the attacking
model and its targeted model. Also, ML-CW gives a clearer
reflection than Rank II, which is probably caused by the hard
classification threshold we induced.
2) A Simple Defense Strategy: To mitigate the threats of ad-
versarial examples, various defense attempts have been made
such as adversarial training [2], defensive distillation [36]
and some detection-based methods [37]. One practical way,
which could be used in combination with any machine learn-
ing models, is to pre-process input examples to purify the
possible perturbations. During our experiments, an interesting
bservation a tracts us i that: JPEG encoding could defense
the diverse multi-label adversarial attacks to some extent.
Fig. 3 shows the prediction histograms of the PNG adversarial
images ge erated by ML-CW and Rank II, and their JPEG
compression on the label specified attacks. We can see that
Fig. 3: JPEG decoding defense on multi-label attacks.
for both attacking methods and labels, the JPEG histogram
has higher overlapped areas with the histogram of original
images than PNG images. It illustrates that the effect of multi-
label perturbations is largely reduced based on the JPEG
decoding. Though this defense strategy is not always success
especially for larger perturbations, it is still a practical solution
since it requires no extra detecting and training procedure or
specification on targeted labels. Related researches can also be
found in [38]–[40].
V. RELATED WORK
The related work can be categorized into two main topics:
Adversarial Attacks and Multi-label Learning.
A. Adversarial Attacks
The exploration of adversarial attacks roots in the demand
of understanding the vulnerability and robustness of machine
learning models [41]. By exploiting the adversarial games
between machine learning models and attackers [10], effective
attacks could be made to sabotage machine learning models.
Though adversarial attacking has been studied for a long time,
the term of adversarial example is first coined by Szegedy
et al. [1] to refer to the perturbed inputs which mislead a
classifier. Subsequently, vast approaches have been proposed,
which are mainly gradient-based methods focusing on attack-
ing deep learning models. From the optimization perspective,
these methods branch into two categories, i.e., either the one-
shot methods such as the FGS method [2] or the iterative
optimization approaches such as the L-BFGS method [1],
iterative least likely method [39], Jacobian-based saliency map
attack [13], and so on [3], [42], [43]. From the application
perspective, most of them focus on image-related data [11],
[12], while some recent work also investigates other data types
such as text data [44]. Though these methods are mainly pro-
posed for white-box attack as what we target on in this paper,
they can also be used in black-box settings by leveraging
the transferability among models [3], [7]. Besides, adversarial
attacks are also applied in the training process to enhance
the robustness of various models [2], [18], [45] and utilized
towards the interpretability of deep neural networks [46]–[48].
Though various attempts have been on proposing either un-
targeted or targeted attacks, to our best knowledge, most of
them still rests on the multi-class setting which could not be
directly applied to the multi-label cases.
B. Multi-label Learning.
Generalizing from multi-class setting, multi-label learning
has become a popular learning paradigm in recent years
due to its abundant applications in extensive areas [49]–[51].
Two main tasks in multi-label learning are multi-label clas-
sification and multi-label ranking. Multi-label classification
aims to assign the relevant labels to each instance form a
specified label set [35]. Problem transformation methods [35]
are the most intuitive category of methods which aims to
transform the multi-label classification into multiple binary
classification problems (e.g., binary relevance approach) or a
single multi-class classification problem (e.g., label powerset
approach). Classifier chains [52] is also an alternative ensem-
bling approach belonging to this category, which emphasizes
the relationships among labels. Another popular category of
methods is the algorithm adaptation methods, which adapts the
algorithms to directly perform multi-label classification [22],
[53], [54]. Comparing with multi-label classification, multi-
label ranking is a more general task aiming to generate a
consistent ranking among labels and could be transferred into
the multi-label classification grounded on bipartition thresh-
olds [49]. Besides traditional ranking-based approaches [55],
[56], recent advances have also combined multi-label learning
with adversarial learning and demonstrate the effectiveness
multi-label adversarial examples for adversarial training [18].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we focus on a new problem of generating
multi-label adversarial examples and propose two general
frameworks targeting on attacking multi-label classification
and ranking models, respectively. For each type of the frame-
work, we propose two specific iterative methods to generate
targeted multi-label adversarial examples. By conducting ex-
periments with different attacking strategies on deep neural
networks, we empirically validate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed attacking methods and the vulnerability of multi-label
deep learning models on various targeted attacks. The future
work will lie in proposing effective defensive methods to
improve the robustness of multi-label learning models. Further
theoretical analysis on different attacking perturbations may
enhance interpretability and security of multi-label learning
models, which is also intriguing for future exploration.
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